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Book Review
The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design by William A.
Dembski (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2004) 334 pp. Reviewed by Tony Jelsma, Associate
Professor of Biology, Dordt College.
When I was young I would occasionally have nightmares in which I was running away from some perceived enemy. The harder I would run, the more it
would feel as if I were not making progress and the
ground were slipping beneath my feet. William
Dembski, one of the leaders in the battle to have
Intelligent Design (ID) accepted in the scientific community, must often feel the same way. The more he
rebuts particular challenges to ID, the less effect these
rebuttals seem to have. The same objections to ID are
raised over and over again, despite their having been
addressed repeatedly by Dembski and others. The
Design Revolution was written as a systematic response
to all the critiques of ID theory. The book is not directed to the scientific establishment and therefore breaks no
new ground in this debate. Instead, Dembski has written
a catechism of brief essays in response to the many questions that are raised against Intelligent Design theory.
Although such a format risks a “straw man” approach
(i.e. only the easy objections are raised), Dembski
addresses all the challenges to ID (and more) that I have
encountered in my years of following this debate.
The book has 44 short chapters divided into six sections. In the first section, entitled “Basic Distinctions,”
Dembski explains what ID is, and what it is not.
Opponents of ID often refer to it as “Intelligent Design
Creationism.” The intent here is to try to discredit ID
by associating it with Creation Science. To counter this
association, Dembski explains that Creationism and ID
have distinct approaches. Creationism starts from
Scripture and views science, particularly the science of
origins, from the perspective of one’s interpretation of
Scripture. Conversely, ID, while compatible with theism, does not use Scripture in its arguments. Although
ID purports to be able to detect the presence of design,
the identity of the designer is not part of ID per se. To
be sure, most (but not all) proponents of ID are
Christians, and for them the identity of the Designer is
known, but ID theory claims (and I agree) that such a
conclusion cannot be reached by science.
In the second section, “Detecting Design,”
Dembski describes what he means by intelligent
design, namely specified complexity. A particular feature may exhibit complexity. For example, the rocky
face of a mountain may exist in many different conformations, all of which are equally improbable.
However, when only one of the conformations specifies the faces of four presidents (as in Mount
Rushmore), one is justified in inferring design. To

make design detection as objective as possible,
Dembski’s explanatory filter lays out three criteria that
allow one to infer that a feature bears the marks of
intelligent design. Using the combination to a safe as
an example, one must first ask if the particular combination was contingent: is there something about the
correct combination that connects it to the opening of
the safe? Since all combinations are equally improbable and the combination was arbitrarily chosen by the
locksmith, the answer to this is no. Second, one must
address the question of complexity: is the correct combination likely to be found by chance? If the answer to
this question is also no, then one must address the question of specificity: is there something special about this
particular combination compared to other combinations? In this case the answer is yes because this particular combination opens the safe. Only then can one
infer design.
I found this the most difficult section of the book.
The subtleties that Dembski addresses, e.g. between
different types of complexity, may be lost on readers,
but he feels compelled to articulate them in order to
address the various misunderstandings and misrepresentations of ID theory.
The more approachable next section deals with
information. Living organisms depend upon information for their formation and replication. Information is
not an inherent property of the DNA of the organism
but must be obtained from somewhere. Dembski
points out that such information cannot come from
nothing but requires an intelligence. Given that information is presently such a prominent part of biology
(as evidenced by the increasing use of bioinformatics),
this point is an important argument for ID.
Since ID directly challenges naturalism, the next
section, “Issues Arising from Naturalism,” addresses
the relationship between naturalism and ID. Can a scientist who is looking for natural explanations of biological phenomena incorporate ID into such research,
or does scientific progress work against and gradually
invalidate ID? Dembski points out that this is a common misconception. On the contrary, new research is
continually reminding us that biological features are far
more complex than we had imagined and that evolutionary scenarios for their origins are becoming even
less plausible.
In the next section, “Theoretical Challenges to
Intelligent Design,” Dembski goes on to discuss some
commonly raised challenges that are raised against ID.
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Isn’t ID simply an argument from ignorance? This is
known as the “God-of-the-gaps” argument. If we can’t
understand how something came about, one might
assert that “God did it.” Another argument claims that
if ignorance of an evolutionary mechanism is used as
evidence for ID, then ID is obligated to provide its own
mechanism. Is it fair to demand that Darwinism provide details of an evolutionary scenario while ID doesn’t need to? In response, Dembski argues that ID does
not reduce problems in science to a “God did it” mentality, but scientists can use ID to identify features that
show evidence of design. ID is not intended to
describe mechanisms, evolutionary or otherwise; its
minimalist program merely infers evidences of design.
How that design occurred is a question that might or
might not be addressed by science.
I found the last section, entitled “A New Kind of
Science,” to be the most enjoyable to read. In this section, which discusses what it could be like if ID were
an accepted component of science, Dembski is the
most candid. He avoids (and warns against) the dangers of triumphalism that often plague such movements, cautioning that ID has a long way to go before
it will gain acceptance by the scientific community.
For this to occur there needs to be a clear demonstration of the usefulness of a design paradigm. At present,
the scientific community treats ID as a “science-stopper,” accusing it of intellectual laziness in searching for
the true (evolutionary) origin of a certain feature. Even
though engineers are now looking at and copying the
designs of biological structures, the designs that are
being copied are treated as “apparent designs” that
evolved by the Darwinian tools of random mutation
and natural selection.
The biggest hurdle that ID must overcome before it
can gain acceptance from the scientific community is
its usefulness in advancing scientific knowledge. At
present, examples of design are being discovered
(Michael Behe lists several examples of irreducible
complexity in his book Darwin’s Black Box), but such
a designation does not help us to understand the function of these structures. Scientists tend to be a pragmatic lot, and while there may be numerous closet ID
sympathizers, they will not intentionally incorporate
ID into their research unless it advances their research.
Dembski lists several objective measures of progress
that will gauge how well the ID movement is progressing. Judging by these measures and by my own experience, ID has a long way to go before it will have any
impact on scientific research. Given this fact, it is curious that so many Darwinists are up in arms about the
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rise of ID. Indeed, some people have made a career out
of fighting against the ID movement.
I have followed the ID movement quite closely for
a number of years and have tried to see how ID might
fit with a Reformed approach to science and epistemology. There is a danger that ID can be too “scientistic”
and can use science to build a case for God the Creator.
Dembski deftly avoids this danger by pointing out that
ID takes a minimalist stance. The leap from identifying design to identifying the designer (let alone the
attributes of that designer, as is done by natural theology) is not one that science can make. On the other
hand, if we believe the world was created by God, we
should not be surprised if our science would see evidences of His work in creation. But is it necessary to
see design in creation? After all, the invisible qualities
of God that are clear from creation (Romans 1:20) may
not be amenable to scientific study. That’s true, but
many scientific studies, from cosmology to origins of
life to developmental biology, raise significant difficulties for the argument that the world does not display
evidences of design. Thus, I see ID as compatible with
but not a necessary component of my faith.
One must wonder whether the term “revolution” is
appropriate for the inclusion of ID as a part of science,
as the title of this book implies. There would definitely be a conceptual change from the common recognition of “apparent design” to the recognition of actual
design, along with well-developed criteria to detect
design. As was pointed out in Thomas Kuhn’s book
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, revolutions do
not occur overnight and may not be immediately apparent. A paradigm change occurs with a new generation
of scientists who think differently from the previous
one. As Dembski points out, if ID is to succeed, it will
need to recruit a new generation of scientists who are
willing to think differently and who can show the usefulness of an ID paradigm in scientific research.
This book is intended for a non-specialist audience,
but it is not an easy read. I found it quite repetitious
and at times wondered if Dembski really needed to go
into such excruciating detail, particularly considering
the intended audience. As the author noted, one need
not read the book sequentially but can begin anywhere.
The problem with such an organization is that the basic
arguments need to be repeated in different parts of the
book. The Design Revolution might serve best as a reference work that provides rebuttals to common criticisms of ID.

